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CONCEPTS, PERCEPTION AND THE DUAL PROCESS
THEORIES OF MIND
ABSTRACT: In this article we argue that the problem of the re-
lationships between concepts and perception in cognitive science
is blurred by the fact that the very notion of concept is rather con-
fused. Since it is not always clear exactly what concepts are, it is
not easy to say, for example, whether and in what measure con-
cept possession involves entertaining and manipulating percep-
tual representations, whether concepts are entirely different from
perceptual representations, and so on. As a paradigmatic example
of this state of affairs, we will start by taking into consideration
the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content.
The analysis of such a distinction will lead us to the conclusion
that concept is a heterogeneous notion. Then we shall take into
account the so called dual process theories of mind; this approach
also points to concepts being a heterogeneous phenomenon: dif-
ferent aspects of conceptual competence are likely to be ascribed
to different types of systems. We conclude that without a clear
specification of what concepts are, the problem of the relation-
ships between concepts and perception is somewhat ill-posed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In our opinion, the problem of the relationships between concepts and
perception in cognitive science is blurred by the fact that the very no-
tion of concept is rather confused. Since it is not always clear exactly
what concepts are, it is not easy to say, for example, whether and in
what measure concept possession involves entertaining and manipulat-
ing perceptual representations, whether concepts are entirely different
from perceptual representations, and so on. As a paradigmatic exam-
ple of this state of affairs, we will start with some considerations on
the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content (sect.
2). The analysis of this distinction will lead us to the conclusion that
concept is a heterogeneous notion. In sect. 3 we shall take into ac-
count the so-called dual process theories of mind. This approach also
suggests that concepts are likely to be a heterogeneous phenomenon:
it is plausible that different aspects of conceptual competence must be
ascribed to different types of systems. Section 4 illustrates an example
in this sense: compositionality on the one hand and (some aspects of)
typicality effects on the other can be accounted for in terms of different
types of representation. Some conclusions follow (sect. 5).
2. CONCEPTUAL VS. NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT
The notion of nonconceptual content was initially proposed by Gareth
Evans (1982), and subsequently adopted by many other philosophers,
such as José Luis Bermúdez, Tim Crane and Christopher Peacocke.
Bermúdez & Cahen (2011) is an overview of the debate on this topic,
and Gunther (2003) is a collection of classical papers on the issue. The
central idea is that some mental states have a representational content
that is not structured in terms of concepts. In this section we argue that
the viability of the notion of nonconceptual content (and, in particular,
its profitability for cognitive science) is undermined by the fact that: i)
the use of the term “concept” in philosophy is often not homogeneous
with its use in cognitive psychology, and ii) even within the fields of
philosophy and psychology considered separately, a coherent notion of
concept does not emerge.
According to nonconceptualist philosophers, nonconceptual contents
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do not require conceptual abilities. As a consequence, if some mental
state is nonconceptual, its bearer may not even possess the concepts
needed to specify its content. Initially, this notion was applied to the
phenomenal content of perceptual states; subsequently it was extended
to other fields (such as subpersonal and computational states). Philoso-
phers are currently debating whether or not such nonconceptual con-
tents exist, or if mental content is always organized in terms of concepts,
as is claimed by McDowell (1994), for example. Within cognitive sci-
ence, proposals for applying the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction
have been developed for example by Raftopoulos &Müller (2006), and,
in the field of visual perception, by Jacob & Jeannerod (2003). During
the 1990s the notion of nonconceptual content was applied to repre-
sentations in connectionist models (Cussins 1990; Clark 1994).
In our opinion some aspects of the conceptual/nonconceptual dis-
tinction appear problematic when applied to cognitive science (Dell’Anna
& Frixione 2010). As discussed in recent philosophical literature (for
instance see Machery 2005, 2009; Piccinini 2011), difficulties arise in
characterizing the notion of concept itself. In the first place, the use of
the term “concept” in the philosophical tradition is often not homoge-
neous with the use of the same term in empirical psychology. Briefly,
we could say that in cognitive psychology the emphasis is on such tasks
as categorization, learning or induction, and a concept is essentially in-
tended as the mental representation of a category. According to many
philosophers, on the other hand, concepts are above all the components
of thoughts. Even if we leave aside the problem of specifying exactly
what thoughts are, this requires a more demanding notion of concept.
In other words, some phenomena that are classified as conceptual by
psychologists turn out to be nonconceptual for philosophers. There are,
thus, mental representations of categories that philosophers would not
consider genuine concepts. For example, according to many philoso-
phers, concept possession involves the ability to make explicit, high
level inferences, and sometimes also the ability to justify them (Pea-
cocke 1992; Brandom 1994; Bermúdez 1995). This clearly exceeds the
possession of mere mental representations of categories. Moreover, ac-
cording to some philosophers, concepts can be attributed only to agents
who can use natural language (i.e. only adult human beings).
On the other hand, psychologists are more tolerant on concept at-
www.thebalticyearbook.org
Dual process theories 4
tribution. Elizabeth Spelke’s experiments on infants (see e.g. Spelke
1994; Spelke & Kinzler 2007) are symptomatic of the difference in ap-
proach between (some) psychologists and (some) philosophers. Such
experiments demonstrate that the mental representation of some ex-
tremely general categories is very precocious and presumably innate.
According to the author, these experiments show that very young chil-
dren possess certain concepts (e.g. the concept of physical object). But
among nonconceptualist philosophers, such as Bermudez (Bermúdez
1995; Bermúdez & Cahen 2011), these same data have been interpreted
as a paradigmatic example of the existence of nonconceptual contents
in agents (children) that have not yet developed a conceptual system.
The fact that philosophers often consider concepts mainly as the
components of thoughts has led to a great emphasis on compositional-
ity and on related features, such as productivity and systematicity, that
are often less important in the psychological study of concepts. On the
other hand, it is well known that compositionality is at odds with typi-
cality effects, which are crucial in most psychological characterizations
of concepts (see sect. 4 below). The distinction between conceptual
and nonconceptual content has been developed within the philosoph-
ical tradition, and therefore rests on an essentially “philosophical” no-
tion of concept. Given the state of affairs described above, one could
suspect that such a distinction cannot be profitably integrated into the
research on concepts in cognitive psychology and, more generally, into
the discourse of cognitive science. This, of course, should not be a
problem if the philosophical notion of concept is clear and theoreti-
cally useful. Nevertheless, there remains the problem of conciliating
the philosophical and the psychological notions of concept in order to
avoid conflicts and confusions.
Unfortunately, things are made more complex by the fact that, even
within the two fields of research considered separately, the situation is
not much more encouraging. In neither of the two disciplines does a
clear, unambiguous and coherent notion of concept seem to emerge.
In psychology there are different positions and theories on the nature
of concepts (prototype view, exemplar view, theory theory, etc.) that
cannot easily be integrated. From this point of view, the conclusions
of Murphy (2002) are of great significance, since in many respects
this book reflected the status of empirical research on concepts. Mur-
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phy contrasts the approaches mentioned above in relation to different
classes of problems, including learning, induction, lexical concepts and
children’s concepts. His conclusions are worrying: the result of compar-
ing the various approaches is that “there is no clear, dominant winner”
(ibid. p. 488) and that “[i]n short, concepts are a mess” (p. 492). This
situation persuaded some scholars to doubt whether concepts consti-
tute a homogeneous phenomenon from the point of view of a science
of the mind (see e.g. Machery 2005 and 2009). The situation is also
rather discouraging among philosophers. The disagreement even con-
cerns the ontological status of concepts. Some philosophers accept a
mentalistic position, according to which concepts must be identified
with some class of mental phenomena. Others share a more traditional
anti-psychologistic stance, and refuse to identify concepts with mental
states or processes. For example (considering authors who accept the
existence of nonconceptual content) Bermúdez & Cahen (2011) states
that “concepts are semantic entities rather than psychological entities”,
and on this point they agree with Peacocke (1992). Conversely, Michael
Tye (2006) claims that “[concepts] are mental representations of a sort
that can occur in thought” (p. 506). The mental nature of concepts is
accepted by philosophers like Fodor and Dretske among others. A dis-
agreement of such significance casts doubt on whether we are in fact
dealing with the same notions. And, above all, one wonders what util-
ity there can be for empirical psychology in anti-psychologistic positions
that deny the mental nature of concepts. However, disagreement is not
limited to this point. For example, those who claim that concepts must
be characterized in terms of (some or all of) the inferences in which
they are involved are inclined to accept some form of holistic or molec-
ularist position that is strongly opposed by supporters of atomism, first
and foremost Jerry Fodor (1998). Furthermore, another problem that
emerges when considering the conceptual/non-conceptual distinction
is that the notion of non-conceptual content likewise seems to be very
heterogeneous. For example, Tye claims that the nonconceptual con-
tent of visual perception encompasses everything that falls within the
scope of foveal vision. Yet, at the same time, the phenomena studied
by Elizabeth Spelke in her experiments should also concern noncon-
ceptual content. In other words, nonconceptual content should include
both raw proximal stimuli and representations in which data are pro-
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cessed and undergo complex forms of categorization (for example in
terms of physical objects, faces or cause-effect relations). Consider also
Jacob and Jeannerod’s model (Jacob & Jeannerod 2003), according to
which visual percepts and visuomotor representations (i.e. the repre-
sentations processed respectively by the ventral and the dorsal path of
the visual system) are both endowed with nonconceptual content, even
though these two kinds of representation are profoundly different from
the point of view both of their format and their purpose.
3. CONCEPTS AND DUAL PROCESS THEORIES
Summing up, there are good reasons to suspect that the very notion of
concept is somewhat heterogeneous, and that this negatively affects the
possibility of conclusively investigating such distinctions as conceptual
vs. nonconceptual, conceptual vs. perceptual, and so on. We have al-
ready mentioned that in psychology different positions and theories on
the nature of concepts have been proposed; these are usually grouped
into three main classes: prototype views, exemplar views and theory-
theories (see again Murphy 2002). These approaches turn out not to be
mutually exclusive. Rather, they seem to succeed in explaining differ-
ent classes of cognitive phenomena, and many researchers hold that all
of them are needed to explain psychological data. This consideration
led Edouard Machery (Machery 2005, 2009) to claim that concept is
not a natural kind, hypothesising that three different natural kinds ex-
ist, corresponding respectively to prototypes, exemplars and theories.
If concepts are not a homogeneous category, then the problem of the
relationships between concepts and perception must be split into dif-
ferent problems. In the following we advance the hypothesis that there
are other reasons to suspect that concepts are not a homogeneous class
of entities from the standpoint of cognitive science. In particular, we
shall take into account suggestions from the so-called dual process the-
ories of mind. As we shall see, this should also influence the problem
of the relationships between concepts and perception.
According to the dual process theories (Stanovich &West 2000; Evans
& Frankish 2008; Kahneman 2011) two different types of cognitive pro-
cesses and systems exist, which have been called respectively system 1
and system 2.
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System 1 processes are automatic. They are phylogenetically older, and
are shared by humans and other animal species. They are innate, and
control instinctive behaviors, so they do not depend on training or spe-
cific individual abilities and, in general, are cognitively undemanding.
They are associative, and operate in a parallel and fast way. Moreover,
system 1 processes are not consciously accessible to the subject.
System 2 processes are phylogenetically more recent, and are specific
to the human species. They are conscious and cognitively penetrable
(i.e. accessible to consciousness), and are based on explicit rule follow-
ing. As a consequence, if compared to system 1, system 2 processes are
sequential and slower, and cognitively more demanding. Performances
that depend on system 2 processes are usually affected by acquired skills
and differences in individual capabilities.
The dual process approach was originally proposed to account for
systematic errors in reasoning: systematic reasoning errors (consider
the classical examples of the selection task or the conjunction fallacy)
should be ascribed to fast, associative and automatic system 1 pro-
cesses, while system 2 is responsible for the slow and cognitively de-
manding activity of producing answers that are correct with respect to
the canons of normative rationality.
In our opinion, the distinction between system 1 and system 2 pro-
cesses may also be plausibly applied to the problem of conceptual rep-
resentations described in the above section (for a similar position in this
respect, see Piccinini 2011; we shall briefly return to Piccinini’s stance
in the conclusions of this paper — sect. 5). For example, categorization
based on typical traits (either prototype based or exemplar based) is,
presumably, in many cases a fast and automatic process which does not
require any explicit effort, and which therefore could presumably be
attributed to a type 1 system. On the contrary, there are types of infer-
ence that are usually included within "conceptual competence", which
are slow and cognitively demanding and which should be attributed
to processes that are more likely to be ascribed to type 2. An example
could be categorization processes based on complex classical definitions
given in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (indeed, according
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to the so-called classical theory, concepts can be defined in terms of sets
of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions).
Consider for example the well-known Linda problem and the al-
ready mentioned conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman 1983). In a
well-known experiment from the psychology of probabilistic reasoning,
subjects are given a description of a person named Linda that perfectly
fits the stereotype of a feminist activist. Then they are asked to judge
if it is more likely that Linda is (a) a bank teller or (b) a bank teller
and a feminist. The majority of subjects choose (b), without realizing
that being a feminist bank teller is in any case more demanding (and
therefore less probable) than simply being a bank teller. Indeed, the
conjunction fallacy consists in failing to realize that a conjunction is al-
ways less probable than its conjuncts. From the standpoint of a theory
of reasoning, this is a paradigmatic case of a systematic error that, ac-
cording to the dual process approach, can be explained in terms of the
system 1 vs. system 2 distinction: the conjunction fallacy is an exem-
plary case of the effects of a system 1 process. However, if we consider
the problem from the point of view of a theory of concepts, the conjunc-
tion fallacy can be interpreted as an example of the strong tendency of
human subjects to resort to prototypical information in categorization,
even when this is not appropriate (at least from the point of view of
those who devised the experiment): Linda is categorized as a feminist
because she perfectly fits the prototypical traits of a feminist (while she
does not in the least fit the prototypical traits of a bank teller). So, we
could see the “error” as being originated by a process of categorization
based on prototypical knowledge.
Typicality effects in categorisation and, in general, in category rep-
resentation are crucial for human cognition. Under what conditions
should we say that somebody knows the concept DOG (or, in other terms,
that (s)he possesses an adequate mental representation of it)? It is not
easy to say. However, if a person does not know that, for example, dogs
usually bark, that they typically have four legs and that their body is
covered with fur, that in most cases they have a tail and that they wag
it when they are happy, then we probably should conclude that this
person does not grasp the concept DOG. Nevertheless, all these pieces
of information are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for be-
ing a dog. In fact, they are traits that characterise dogs in typical (or
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prototypical) cases.
The concept DOG is not exceptional from this point of view. The
majority of everyday concepts behave in this way. For most concepts,
a classical definition in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is
not available (or, even if it is available, it is unknown to the agent).
On the other hand, it may be that we know the classical definition of a
concept, but typical/prototypical knowledge still plays a central role in
many cognitive tasks. Consider the following example: nowadays most
people know the necessary and sufficient conditions for being WATER:
water is the chemical substance whose formula is H2O, i.e., the sub-
stance whose molecules are formed by one atom of oxygen and two
atoms of hydrogen. However, in most cases of everyday life, when we
categorise a sample of something as WATER, we do not take advantage
of this piece of knowledge. We use such typical traits as the fact that
(liquid) water is usually a colourless, odourless and tasteless fluid.
The use of typical knowledge in cognitive tasks such as categori-
sation has to do with the constraints that concern every finite agent
that has a limited access to the knowledge relevant for a given task.
In most cases, cognitive processes based on typical knowledge are fast
and automatic, cognitively undemanding, and are presumably homoge-
nous to the processes employed in similar tasks by non-human animals.
Consider for example the following variant of the Linda problem. Let
us suppose that a certain individual Pippo is described as follows. He
weighs about 200 kg, and he is approximately two meters tall. His
body is covered with a thick, dark fur, he has a large mouth with robust
teeth and paws with long claws. He roars and growls. Now, given this
information, we have to evaluate the plausibility of the two following
alternatives:
a) Pippo is a mammal;
b) Pippo is a mammal, and he is wild and dangerous.
Which is the “correct” answer? According to the dictates of the nor-
mative theory of probability, it is surely a). But if you encounter Pippo
in the wilderness, it would probably be best to run.
So, many aspects of the psychology of concepts have presumably to
do with fast, type 1 system and processes, while others can be more
plausibly ascribed to type 2. In particular, the ability to make explicit,
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high level inferences, and, moreover, the ability to justify them, which
some philosophers consider to be constitutive of concept possession
(see, for instance, Peacocke 1992; Brandom 1994), can be plausibly
considered as type 2 processes.
Problems arise from the fact that the dual process approach is not
monolithic. Different dual process theories exist – a detailed review
is provided in Evans (2008). However, the dual process approach has
also received a number of criticisms, many of which have recently been
reviewed and answered by Evans and Stanovich (2013a; 2013b). (For
a skeptical attitude towards the possibility of applying the dual process
theories to the study of concepts see sect. 8 of Machery 2011). In any
case, it is likely that many kinds of type 1 systems and processes exist,
with partially different properties. Consider, for example, expertise:
an art historian can distinguish a painting by, say, Rubens from one by
van Dyck at a glance and without the need for any form of conscious,
sequential application of explicit rules. But surely this ability is not in-
nate and depends on specific training (and, presumably, it is not shared
with other animal species). A recurring distinction in the dual process
literature concerns the interaction of the two types of system. A first
possibility (Sloman 1996) is that they operate in parallel. In this case,
adopting the terminology proposed by Evans (2008), the two systems
are assumed to be parallel-competitive. A second possibility (Kahne-
man & Frederick 2002; Kahneman 2011; Evans & Stanovich 2013a) is
the so called default-interventionist approach. According to this view,
deliberative type 2 reasoning processes can inhibit the possibly biased,
default responses of type 1 systems, and replace them with the outputs
of reflective reasoning. This second perspective better fits our approach.
However, our concern here is not to take a stand for some specific
version of the theory. In particular, we do not make any claim about
how many systems involved in the two types of process effectively ex-
ist. Rather, our claim is that dual process theories can supply some
useful suggestions in order to understand and classify the wide class of
cognitive phenomena that pertain to human conceptual abilities.
A clarification is appropriate. The appeal to dual process theories
could be interpreted as a way to re-introduce some form of the con-
ceptual/nonconceptual distinction. This is definitely not our intent. In
spite of some superficial similarities, the system 1 vs. system 2 dis-
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tinction does not overlap with the conceptual vs. non-conceptual op-
position. In the first place, the conceptual/nonconceptual dichotomy
originated in a philosophical context: it rests on conceptual, a priori
analyses and was proposed while disregarding any form of evidence
coming from the empirical study of the mind. Only later did some the-
orists try to apply it to cognitive science, but this, far from clarifying the
situation, generated further confusion (for example, it is not even clear
if nonconceptual content must be situated at a personal or a subper-
sonal level of analysis). Moreover, the conceptual vs. nonconceptual
distinction is between two types of content, and the philosophical no-
tion of content is a semantic notion that is not immune to problems,
and it is not clear if and in what measure it can be profitably adopted
within the scope of an empirical science of mind. On the other hand,
the system 1 vs. system 2 dichotomy is an empirical distinction that
originated within the field of cognitive science, and it does not con-
cern different types of content, but different types of processes and/or
systems that can be individuated within the mental architecture. Fi-
nally, the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction presupposes a notion
of concept, and, in our opinion, the point is precisely that a clear and
unproblematic notion of concept is lacking. The system 1/system 2 op-
position has the advantage of having been developed independently;
therefore, the debate concerning dual process approaches should offer
a neutral point of view in order to evaluate some problems concerning
concepts in cognitive science.
Compositionality, which is often considered to be an irrevocable
trait of conceptual systems, could turn out to be more akin to system
2 abilities. Compositionality has to do with higher cognition and with
complex inferential tasks: paradigmatic examples of compositional sys-
tems are natural languages and logical formalisms. And composition-
ality is somewhat at odds with typicality effects: the characterisation of
concepts in typical terms is difficult to reconcile with the requirement
of compositionality. According to a well-known argument (Fodor 1981;
Osherson & Smith 1981) prototypes are not compositional. In brief, the
argument runs as follows: consider a concept like PET FISH. It results
from the composition of the concept PET and of the concept FISH. How-
ever, the prototype of PET FISH cannot result from the composition of
the prototypes of PET and FISH: a typical PET is furry and warm, a typ-
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ical FISH is greyish, but a typical PET FISH is neither furry and warm
nor greyish. A possible solution should be to hypothesize that com-
positional representations and representations in (proto)typical terms
depend on different cognitive components, based on different types of
representation.
In this respect it may be interesting to take into account what hap-
pens in the field of the computational simulations of cognition (Frix-
ione 2013). In artificial intelligence, the representation of prototypi-
cal information is problematic in compositional knowledge representa-
tion formalisms. For example, description logics (Baader et al. 2010)
are a widespread class of concept oriented representation systems (the
Web Ontology Language OWL belongs to this class). They allow the
representation of taxonomies of concepts in terms of sets of necessary
and/or sufficient conditions, but do not allow for the representation
of typical traits. On the other hand, description logics are fully com-
positional systems: they are subsets of first order predicate logic, and
logical formalisms are compositional. Consider classification, one of
the most characteristic forms of inference defined on this type of for-
malism: classifying a concept amounts to individuating its more specific
superconcepts and its more general subconcepts, or, in other words, to
identify implicit superconcept-subconcept relations in a taxonomy. For
human subjects such a process is far from natural, fast and automatic: it
is usually slow, it can require great effort and it is facilitated by specific
training. So, in terms of dual process theories, the inferential task of
classifying concepts in taxonomies is prima facie a type 2 process, qual-
itatively different from the task of categorizing items as instances of a
certain class on the basis of typical traits (e.g. the task of categorizing
Fido as a dog because he barks, has fur and wags his tail). Therefore,
it is plausible that conceptual representation in computational systems
should be assigned to (at least) two different kinds of components re-
sponsible for different tasks: type 2 processes, involved in complex and
cognitively demanding inference tasks, and fast and automatic type 1
processes (such as those involved in categorization based on prototyp-
ical information). In the next section we shall explore some aspects of
this hypothesis.
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4. COMPOSITIONALITY, TYPICALITY AND CONCEPTUAL SPACES
Let us consider an argument against the possibility of reconciling com-
positionality and typicality effects that dates back toOsherson and Smith
(Osherson & Smith 1981), and which is a version of the pet fish argu-
ment mentioned above. Osherson and Smith’s original aim was to show
that fuzzy logic is inadequate to capture typicality. However, as we shall
see, their argument has a wider range of application.
At first sight, fuzzy logic seems to be a promising approach in order
to face the problem of typicality. Indeed, one consequence of typical-
ity effects is that some members of a category C turn out to be better
(i.e. more typical) instances of C than others. For example, a robin is
a better example of the category of birds than, say, a penguin or an os-
trich. More typical instances of a category are those that share a greater
number of typical features (e.g. the ability to fly for birds, having fur
for mammals, and so on). The fuzzy value of a predicate (say, F) could
be interpreted as a measure of typicality: given two individuals h and
k, it seems natural to assume that F(h) > F(k) iff h is a more typical
instance of F than k is.
However, let us consider the zebra in fig. 1 (and let us suppose that
her name is Pina).
Figure 1
Pina is presumably a good instance of the concept POLKA DOT ZE-
BRA
1; therefore, if such a concept were represented as a fuzzy predicate,
then the value of the formula polka_dot_zebra(Pina) should be close to
1, say:
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(1) polka_dot_zebra(Pina) = .97
On the other hand, Pina is a rather poor (i.e. atypical) instance
of the concept ZEBRA; therefore the value of the formula zebra(Pina)
should be low, say:
(2) zebra(Pina) = .2
(of course, the specific values are not relevant here; the point is that
Pina is more typical as a polka dot zebra than as a zebra). But POLKA
DOT ZEBRA can be expressed as the conjunction of the concepts ZEBRA
and POLKA DOT THING; i.e. in logical terms, it holds that:
(3) ∀x (polka_dot_zebra(x)↔ zebra(x) ∧ polka_dot_thing(x))
Now, the problem is the following: if we adopt the simplest and
most widespread form of fuzzy logic, the value of a conjunction is cal-
culated as the minimum of the values of its conjuncts, and this makes it
impossible for the value of zebra(Pina) to be .2 and that of polka_dot_-
zebra(Pina) to be .97 at the same time. Of course, there are other types
of fuzzy logic, in which the value of a conjunction is not the minimum
of the values of the conjuncts. But in no case can a conjunction exceed
the value of its conjuncts. Worse still, in logic, once a suitable order has
been imposed on truth-values, it generally holds that:
val(A ∧ B) ≤ val(A) and val(A ∧ B) leq val(B)
So, the problem pointed out by Osherson and Smith does not seem
to concern only fuzzy logic. Rather, Osherson and Smith’s argument
seems to show that, in general, logic based representations are unlikely
to be compatible with typicality effects. And, as mentioned before, logic
based representations are paradigmatic examples of compositional sys-
tems, which fully embody the Fregean principle of compositionality of
meaning. (Note also that this is exactly the same problem which, in the
context of probabilistic reasoning, gives rise to the conjunction fallacy
mentioned in sect. 3 above.)
Indeed, the situation seems to bemore promising if, instead of logic,
we face typicality by adopting some other form of representation, such
as for example conceptual spaces, a geometric representation proposed
by Peter Gärdenfors (Gärdenfors 2000). A conceptual space (CS) is a
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space in a certain number of quality dimensions. Concepts are repre-
sented in the terms of such dimensions, and correspond to regions in
CSs. CS dimensions can be more or less directly related to perception
(such as temperature, weight, brightness, pitch), or more abstract in
nature. Each quality dimension is associated with a geometrical (topo-
logical or metrical) structure. The central idea behind this approach
is that knowledge representation takes advantage of the geometrical
structure of conceptual spaces. For example, similarity should be cal-
culated in terms of some suitable distance measure. So, if we represent
a concept as a (convex) area in a suitable conceptual space CS, then
the degree of typicality of a certain individual can be measured as the
distance of the corresponding point from the centre of the area. The
conjunction of two concepts is represented as the intersection of the
two corresponding areas, as in fig. 2.
Figure 2
According to the conceptual space approach, Pina should presum-
ably turn out to be very close to the centre of POLKA DOT ZEBRA (i.e.
to the intersection between ZEBRA and POLKA DOT THING). In other
words, she should turn out to be a very typical polka dot zebra, despite
being very eccentric with respect to both the concepts ZEBRA and POLKA
DOT THING (that is to say, she is an atypical zebra and an atypical polka
dot object). This seems to better capture our intuitions about typicality.
We should conclude that the treatment of compositionality and that
of (some forms of) typicality require rather different approaches and
forms of representation, and should therefore presumably be assigned
to different components of the cognitive architecture.
The above considerations can be reconciled with both a hybrid ap-
proach to concepts (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976; Osherson & Smith
1981) and with the so-called heterogeneity hypothesis (Machery & Sep-
pälä 2010; Machery 2014). Here we do not take a stand on this point.
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Our concern is simply to stress that some aspects of typicality effects
have features that are closer to those usually associated to type 1 sys-
tems and processes (they are fast, automatic, and so on), while compo-
sitional representations seem to better fit type 2 tasks. This favours the
hypothesis of adopting different formalisms for representing different
aspects of conceptual knowledge.
5. SOME CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, different aspects of “conceptual competence” seem to
involve different types of cognitive processes (e.g. type 1 vs. type 2
processes), and seem to require different kinds of representation (e.g.
compositional, “linguistic” representations vs. some other type of repre-
sentation, such as conceptual spaces). Perception (or, at least, low-level
perception) is presumably more akin to type 1 processes, and more re-
mote from type 2 ones. Therefore, those aspects of concepts (if any)
that are related to perception presumably pertain to type 1 processes.
Moreover, geometric representations such as conceptual spaces seem
prima facie to be closer to the format of the output of perceptual sys-
tems.
We do not maintain that typicality pertains exclusively to fast, low-
level type 1 processes. Certain forms of categorization, which are cer-
tainly more akin to type 2 processes, do not rest on classical definitions
given in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Let us consider
the following hypothetical example: suppose that a rather inexperi-
enced amateur naturalist (let us call him Jean-Baptiste) finds a speci-
men like that in fig. 3 A.2
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Figure 3
Prima facie, Jean Baptiste classifies this calcareous twisted tube,
embedded in a piece of coral, as the shell of a worm of the phylum
Annelida. However, upon closer analysis, he notes that the shape of
the initial portion of the tube is similar to the spire of a gastropod (a
“snail”). Now, Jean-Baptiste knows various things about gastropoda;
for example, he knows that the apical spires of gastropod shells are the
first to develop. So, when the animal in fig. 3 A was young, it presum-
ably resembled a small snail (as in fig. 3 B), which later clung to a solid
substrate and developed “as a worm”. Jean-Baptiste knows also that
the juvenile shape of a life form is very important in order to classify it.
So, he hypothesizes that the twisted tube in fig. 3 A is actually a mol-
lusk shell, albeit a strange one. (And he is right, because it effectively
is a gastropod of the genre Magilus).
Now, a process like this certainly cannot be ascribed to a type 1
system: it is slow, sequential, penetrable to consciousness, and it de-
pends on high level, acquired pieces of knowledge. But neither does
it resemble the application of a classical definition; it rather depends
on forms of typicality-based reasoning, on abductions and on “theory
based” inferences.
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As said before, Machery (2005; 2009) claims that concept is not a
natural kind; he rather hypothesises three different kinds, which cor-
respond respectively to prototypes, exemplars and theories. (Piccinini
2011) argues for an alternative point of view, according to which only
two kinds of concept exist: implicit and explicit; he correlates implicit
and explicit concepts respectively with system 1 and system 2 processes.
In our opinion, it is likely that in some respect both Machery and Pic-
cinini are right, in that they both individuate important discontinuities
in the traditional notion of concept. However, it is also likely that the
distinction between system 1 vs. system 2 processes is in part orthogo-
nal to Machery’s tripartition, and there are good reasons to suspect that
they are not mutually exclusive (Frixione & Lieto 2012; Frixione 2013).
In conclusion, the situation is rather complex. It is plausible that,
in light of the distinction between type 1 vs. type 2 systems, certain
aspects of conceptual knowledge pertain to type 1 systems, and that
“type 1 concepts” are likely to be closer to perceptual processes. But,
without a clear specification of what concepts are, the problem of the
relationships between concepts and perception remains somewhat ill-
posed; a satisfactory solution would presuppose a better understanding
of the notion of concept itself.
Notes
1Osherson and Smith’s original example was not a polka dot zebra but a striped apple.
2From A.H. Cooke, A.E. Shipley, F.R.C. Reed (1895), Cambridge Natural History, Vol.
III: Molluscs, Brachiopods (Recent), Brachiopods (Fossil), London, Macmillan and Co.
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